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Money, Religion, and Tyranny:
God and the Demonic in 
Luther's Antifragile Theology
Guillermo Hansen
Introduction
A new specter is haunting our lives—the specter of debt. A sense of 
powerlessness is disrupting our economic, psychological, political, cul­
tural, and spiritual “comfort zones.” It is as though scenes and realities 
that once were associated with the Global South are now knocking at our 
doors. Debt is no longer a problem ravaging faraway lands but is installed 
in the living rooms of our mortgaged homes, it is carried in the pockets 
of our trousers and purses, and it determines who can pursue higher 
education and even who can enter the ministry. Some think that this is 
a moral problem, the erosion of a Protestant ethic that once saw debt as 
synonymous with sin and its replacement by the hedonistic code of “buy 
now and pay later.”1 Others ruminate that debt is the result of policies 
and programs of entitlements and (social) spending that are dragging our 
country to an economic Gehenna. While there are some truths in both 
views, both miss the mark. The debt crisis is a structural problem: the 
“problem” that, paradoxically, has been the engine of the capitalist mode 
of accumulation since its inception. Not only is money created day in and 
day out on the basis of debt; not only do banks exist by lending what they 
don’t have (i.e., cash) through the creation of what did not exist (i.e., 
debtors); but the very circulation of commodities, services, and labor is 
structurally based on debt. What we are experiencing today is very sim­
ple: The capitalist chicken has come home to roost after a long detour 
through overseas coops.
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How is debt related to theology? Surprisingly, Luther offers us two 
points of entry into this problem. One is his analysis of early capitalist 
practices during the 16lh century and the ravaging effect of debt across 
the society of his day. The other is his identification of the reality of 
money and its instruments not merely as ethical or practical problems, 
but as confessional and religious ones: “The trust and faith of the heart 
alone make both God and an idol,” Luther remarks in his Large Cate­
chism, adding laconically that “mammon . . .  is the most common idol 
on earth.”2 In the first part of this paper, I shall explore Luther’s under­
standing of the early practices of capitalism and to what extent his view 
can be gauged against Walter Benjamin’s thesis that one can behold in 
capitalism a religion. We shall see that Luther approached the matter of 
money, capital, and debt as the arena of an apocalyptic struggle between 
God and the Devil, a struggle marked by a misplaced and distorted “trust 
and faith.” In the Reformer’s view, the economy of “gift,” encapsulated 
in the symbol of Christ, is contrasted with the economy of “debt,” the 
paragon of the demonic.
If one can behold in capitalism a (demonic) religion, how is this 
manifested today? In the second part of this paper, I will approach the 
“religious” traces of the contemporary hyper-financial capitalism that 
emerged as a result of a transference of divine attributes to the market, 
and how the virtual and speculative nature of financial capitalism on the 
one hand, and consumerism on the other, reflect subjective valuations as 
a form of (idolatrous) “faith.” If for Luther faith meant to “trust in God 
alone and turn to him, expecting from him only good things; for it is 
he who gives us body, life, food, drink, nourishment, health, protection, 
peace, and all temporal and eternal blessings,”3 then for capitalism, the 
seat of all hope is the miraculous quality of money. I shall concentrate 
particularly on the “religious” promises of capitalism as a concealment 
of the ontological gap that characterizes human existence by promising 
a fulfillment of human personality—a centering of one’s whole self not 
only upon immanent realities but on the active exploitation of the neigh­
bor’s needs and wants.
But if capitalism survives thanks to the deep psychological and 
emotional drives that make it either “God” or an idol, what should our 
Christian stance be? Cynical, reformist, revolutionary? In the third part 
of this paper, I shall return to Luther’s insights from a Pauline-apoca­
lyptic perspective which outlines a threefold strategy for Christian living: 32
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living from the end times as shaped by the event of Christ as gift (justifi­
cation by faith); living between the times as engagement with neighbors 
and creation (love/law); and living at the end of (an historical) time as 
preparation for a revolutionary bifurcation in history. While the latter 
remained underdeveloped and even shunned in Luther, the readiness 
of the Christian that is a mark of the apocalyptic expectation did not. 
From, between, and at the end of times thus mark the proper Christian 
existence: an existence that is critical of current economic practices and 
conceptions (cynical living) ,4 eagerly expectant of the new to come (rev­
olutionary living), and yet engaged in a permanent deferral of the final 
apocalyptic denouement in history for the sake of the most vulnerable in 
creation (reformist living). Luther’s views on the three orders of creation, 
the two kingdoms, and the twofold governance of God allow us to en­
compass the three aspects listed above in a powerful anti-fragile5 recipe 
in the midst of the fragile texture of history.
Luther and Capital
A common assumption among many Lutheran theologians is that 
matters pertaining to political economy (e.g., money and market, labor 
and capital) should be treated with flexibility and lenience, as problems 
occurring in the realm of practical reason—what traditionally has been 
adjudicated to the left hand of God or to the “secular” realm. Because 
nothing that falls within this sphere can represent a danger to salvation or 
to the Gospel, these phenomena thus acquire the connotation of “adiapho- 
ra,” things that have no relation whatsoever to faith or the practice of faith.
Yet for Luther, money, capital, debt, labor, and the economy were 
theological issues of first order, for they refer to relational fields in which 
and through which the struggle between the Devil and Christ was car­
ried out.6 Not only was Luther a keen observer and analyst of the early 
practices of what later will be known as capitalism, but he identifies prac­
tices such as credit, debt, inflation, interest, usury, rent, and monopoly as 
the expression of unbelief, a demonic reality, or even Satan’s kingdom.7 
“Money,” Luther writes, “is the word of the Devil, through which he 
creates all things the way God created through the true word.”8 For him, 
economic as well as political issues were theological realities in the sense 
that these describe not only fields in which the human engages with na­
ture and other humans in productive and distributive spheres that sustain 
the very fabric of creation, but also arenas where God’s very glory is 
at stake. “Creatures are the hands, channels, and means through which
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God bestows all blessings,” Luther states in his Large Catechism.9 And in 
his Confession of 1528, he propounds a theology of three “holy orders” 
(household/economy, secular government, church) through which we 
are engaged in God’s holy work.10
In order to better appreciate the place that the economy in general and 
capitalism in particular had in Luther’s own thought, I propose to follow an 
oblique path that is provided by an heuristic prism contained in the famous 
remark of Walter Benjamin: “One can behold in capitalism a religion, that 
is to say, capitalism essentially serves to satisfy the same worries, anguish, 
and disquiet formerly answered by so-called religion.”" As the German 
text indicates (“Im Kapitalismus ist eine Religion zu erblicken”), Benja­
min does not simply state that capitalism is a religion, but rather that in 
capitalism we can discern one of the structuring principles of religion. Or 
even more poignantly, capitalism is able to function as a religion because 
it explicitly denies that it is a religion. The kernel of religion, according to 
Benjamin, is Schuld—a dual sign that implies both guilt in the religious, 
moral sense and debt in the economic sense.12 For Benjamin, capitalism 
“makes [Schulcl] pervasive. Capitalism is probably the first instance of a 
cult that creates [Schuld], not atonement.”13 This is a critical observation 
because if the basic structure of religion is Schuld (i.e., debt compounded 
by guilt), then capitalism is a sublime expression of the negative pole of this 
structure (i.e., it is sustained by the perpetual generation of debt/guilt). Yet 
the lack of any atonement converts it into an utterly demonic religion. “An 
order, whose sole constitutive concepts are misery and guilt and in which 
there is no way of liberation,” Benjamin writes in Fate and Character, “such 
an order could not [really] be religious”—for it is the demonic appearance 
of it.14 A religion without atonement or liberation is what characterizes the 
historical “enormity” of capitalism. In this instance, “religion is no longer 
the reform of being, but rather its obliteration.”15
It is my aim to show that Luther’s approach to matters pertaining 
to money, capital, and debt are passable of a benjaminian reading, and 
that Benjamin’s fragmentary thoughts can aptly be expanded by Luther’s 
insights. Did Luther regard capitalism as a religion? Certainly he never 
referred to capitalism in these terms, since what today we term capital­
ism (as a mode of relations, production, and accumulation) is a category 
gained through hindsight. Luther himself—just like his contemporaries— 
was not even remotely aware that he was facing the multiple prongs of a 
new economic regime. But while Luther did not possess the overarching 34
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category of “capitalism,” he did indeed address the new type of (eco­
nomic) practices that later will be deemed the core of capitalist modes of 
production and accumulation. Moreover, Luther possessed a concept of 
religion that was able to locate the phenomena of early capitalist practices 
not just as an anomaly in the smooth texture of the feudal world, but as 
the structuring of subjectivities in open discord with Christian faith.
Capitalism as religion? Revisiting the first commandment
What we usually refer to as “religion” is either the result of a histori­
cal-comparative summary of its “marks,” or the salient features of our own 
practices and beliefs. Notions such as God, transcendence, worship and 
ritual, sacred texts, and a set of moral codes appear as the indispensable 
elements of this type of human behavior and thought which in its present 
form can be traced back to the Axial Age.16 But since the dawn of modernity 
and the processes entailed by secularization, we can no longer confine the 
scope of religion to the standard referential poles framed within metaphysi­
cal strategies of thought presupposing the existence of supernatural beings 
or gods. One should not fall into the naive assumption that the secular is 
just secular (i.e., religionless), for modernity and late modernity signify a 
displacement of what constitutes—in Tillich’s celebrated words—the “ul­
timate concern.” Or as the Brazilian economist and theologian Jung Mo 
Sung suggests, modernization entails the secularization of eschatological 
hopes where space and time are conceived in their infinite potentials.17 In 
sum, after the great transformation of modernity, religion does not disap­
pear—it only camouflages itself under a new disguise.18
Cultural anthropological studies offer us a more latitudinarian ap­
proach to the reality of religion, as in Clifford Geertz’ definition: “A 
religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by (3) 
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing 
these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and 
motivations seem uniquely realistic.”19 Adopting the theory of complex 
adaptive systems, another definition is offered by Mark C. Taylor: “Reli­
gion is an emergent, complex, adaptive network of symbols, myths, and 
rituals that, on the one hand, figure schemata of feelings, thinking, and 
acting in ways that lend meaning and purpose and, on the other, disrupt, 
dislocate, and disfigure every stabilizing structure.”20
Can these definitions offer a clue regarding capitalism as a religion? 
In order to appreciate the reaches of Benjamin’s statement, let us turn to a
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minimalist definition of religion that we find in Luther himself. Religion is a 
matter not just captured by a certain cosmology, institutional arrangement, 
or even a previous definition of a metaphysical transcendence, but it is 
lodged in what Luther calls faith as trust: an anthropological phenomenon 
that structures human existence. This is clearly seen in Luther’s commen­
tary on the first commandment in the Large Catechism. We know very well 
his introductory remarks that set in tandem God, heart, and faith:
“You shall have no other gods.” That is, you should regard me 
alone as your God. What does this mean, and how is it to be 
understood? What is to have a god? What is God? Answer:
A god is that to which we look for all good and in which we 
find refuge in every time of need. To have a god is nothing 
else than to trust and believe him with our whole heart. As 
I have often said, the trust and faith of the heart alone make 
both God and an idol. If your faith and trust are right, then 
your God is the true God. On the other hand, if your trust is 
false and wrong, then you have not the true God. For these 
two belong together, faith and God. That to which your heart 
clings and entrusts itself is, I say, really your God.
Yet we often forget the counter-example given by Luther in what im­
mediately follows:
This I must explain a little more plainly, so that it may be 
understood and remembered, by citing some common exam­
ples of failure to observe this commandment. Many a person 
thinks he has God and everything he needs when he has mon­
ey and property; in them he trusts and of them he boasts so 
stubbornly and securely that he cares for no one. Surely such 
a man also has a god—mammon by name, that is, money 
and possessions—on which he fixes his whole heart. It is the 
most common idol on earth. He who has money and property 
feels secure, happy, fearless, as if he were sitting in the midst 
of paradise. On the other hand, he who has nothing doubts 
and despairs as if he never heard of God. Very few there are 
who are cheerful, who do not fret and complain, if they do not 
have mammon. The desire for wealth clings and cleaves to our 
nature all the way to the grave.2'
After expounding on other historical and contemporary examples of 
placing hearts and minds on other “gods” than the one and true God, 36
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Luther concludes that these forms of idolatry do not “consist merely of 
erecting an image and praying to it. It is primarily in the heart, which pur­
sues other things and seeks help and consolation from creatures, saints, 
or devils.”22 Two things need to be noted here: In the first place, Luther 
employs the category of “heart” as a synecdoche or metonymy for the 
subjective dimension of the human being.23 At the same time, this is a ma­
terially and historically mediated subjectivity that is produced (passively 
and actively) through the different relational fields in which persons are 
implicated. These relational fields or spheres are what Luther will call 
“orders” of creation, orders which always serve as a mediation for trust.24
It is precisely this approach that guides Tillich’s conception of the 
dynamics of faith, where faith is defined as the state of being ultimate­
ly concerned. An ultimate concern is not only what claims ultimacy for 
human life or the life of a group, but also what entails the promise of an 
ultimate fulfilment. In this sense, faith is an act of the total personality, 
the most centered of all human acts by which humanity is able to tran­
scend the flux of relative and transitory experiences of paramount reality 
or ordinary life. Therefore, we are driven to faith by an awareness that is 
uniquely human—namely, an awareness of a transcendence to which we 
perceive to belong and which is not our natural possession. The ultimate 
ground for this orientation is not a rational event, but rather the realm 
of archetypal drives that are inscribed at the core of humanity’s psyche.
Yet there is never faith without a content toward which it is direct­
ed, namely, an “object” that symbolically catalyzes the psychic energies 
and concerns of the subject. Furthermore, the dynamic set between the 
subject of faith and the object of faith is bound to erase the distance 
and estrangement between the two if in the relationship established it 
is revealed that both coincide as the same reality: The object of the ulti­
mate concern can never be object without being at the same time subject. 
This phenomenological observation allows Tillich to distinguish between 
true and false ultimacy, and the litmus test for gauging this is the con­
sequences upon the subject, her “personality.” In effect, one may place 
trust in—i.e., expect fulfillment and ultimacy from—objects and events 
such as nation or success, but these are bound to result in an existential 
disappointment. The fact that human beings only actualize their being 
through symbolic forms implies that every symbolic operation involves 
the transposition of one’s being into a form other than one’s own. Thus 
every symbolic expression is fraught with the danger of alienation.25 The
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problem is not the sincerity or depth of these faiths, for they also are 
centered acts of the whole personality. Rather, the point is where this 
centeredness is symbolically located, which leads to the paradoxical loss 
of a center thus resulting in the “disruption of the personality.”26
This disruption of personality, however, is more than a simple in- 
tra-subjective affair, but truly an inter-subjective matter. Luther may have 
been more radical than Tillich on this point, for he saw the existential 
reality of humanity in sharp relational terms where self and neighbor were 
more thoroughly imbricated than in the classical existential expression of 
the twentieth century with its accent upon self-relation.27 False or idola­
trous faith, therefore, always entails consequences for the totality of the 
fabric of life, not just as a consequence of a misplaced individual ego (as 
a sort of contagious or cumulative effect), but because the self is always 
mediated by social, political, and economic relationships.
In the second place, Luther sought to place Mammon (cf. Matthew 
6 :24; Luke 16:13) as a signifier of subjectivities that are implicated in 
the abuse of these spheres which emerge in the concrete material and 
symbolic exchanges that make up human living. In the context of high 
Christendom in which Luther was situated, a context that has already 
subsumed other historical deities in the process of missionary expansion, 
Luther sought to identify a new pattern of exchanges and subjectivity 
formation irrupting within the fold of Christendom. Thus what today we 
term “capitalism” Luther perceived not only as a new form of economic 
and social organization, but also as a new spiritual and material force 
in complete dissonance with Christianity: an idolatry. In other words, a 
new structuring of hearts and bodies based on the “religious” premise 
that something (e.g., money, profit) can be made out of nothing. As we 
shall note below, this is what distinguishes Luther’s critique from the 
caustic medieval condemnations of usury, for he placed the problem of 
money-making squarely within the confession of the first commandment: 
Capitalism is trusting in oneself and making oneself God, “for whatever a 
man [s/c] trusts in and relies upon is his god.”28 Capitalism, thus, can be 
regarded as a religion, albeit a false one. And Luther had a word for this: 
the Devil’s work.
Luther’s theological and pastoral approach to early capitalist practices
In order to grasp Luther’s understanding of capitalism, one should 
not be confined to his most obvious economic writings— Trade and Usury 
(1524) and the Admonition to the Clergy to Preach Against Usury (1540). 38
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References to the economy traverse many of his exegetical, pastoral, and 
theological writings as well. Furthermore, one should regard his explicit 
allusions against capitalist practices as an extension of his initial con­
frontation with the abuse of indulgences and the scholastic pattern of 
thought. Thus there are at least two moments—which increasingly over­
lapped as the Reformation unfolded—that concentrate Luther’s address 
of the problem of capitalism. The first moment, often misunderstood in 
the epic reconstruction of the Reformatory movement as merely a cri­
tique of church abuses, constitutes a veritable casus confessionis that was 
geared not against the Papacy as such, but against the tyranny of a new 
logic and practice within the sphere of the church. This moment corre­
sponds to Luther’s questioning of penance and indulgences, from the 
point of view of a theological postulate where “God does not repay in the 
sense of a fair exchange.”29 The biblical testimony indicates to Luther that 
God and God’s church embody a different distributive system than the 
one presently operating in the ecclesial, political, and economic spheres.
His invectives against indulgences and scholastic thought constitute 
the backbone for Luther’s later theological critique of capitalism. After 
all, in the medieval church, the most precious of religious goods— for­
giveness of sins—had become a commodity through the practices of 
indulgences and penance, thereby creating a market in which the church 
monopolized the profit resulting from the satisfaction of that need. In 
1343, Pope Clement VI gave a “capitalist” turn to the belief and practice 
of indulgences by claiming that the wide distribution of heavenly trea­
sure would lead to an increase in merit, which in turn continued the 
accumulation of treasure in a sort of virtuous cycle.30 Anselm, obviously, 
had previously provided a strong Christological backing to this concept 
of treasure in Cur deus homo? Furthermore, we should never forget that 
the Reformation was preceded by and fueled, inspired, and opposed on 
the basis of the profound debt incurred by the house of the Hohenzollers, 
who had recently acquired Mainz and. Magdeburg for 50,000 gulden that 
needed to be repaid to the lender, the powerful Fugger bankers: Half 
of the income from the selling of indulgences went to pay the lender, 
and half to Rome (who had the “patent” or “property rights” on indul­
gences) . By attacking the church and the practice of indulgences, Luther 
addressed, in spite of his original intentions, the central logic of capital­
ism that held the church in captivity, not only in practice (indulgences 
that transferred the debt to the “buyers”), but also in its theology. In
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effect, the whole confrontation with the works-righteousness scholastic 
scheme was an attack on the very premise of a Schuld that can and must 
be repaid by the sinner-debtor.
The second moment (from the 1520s onward) corresponds to Lu­
ther’s specific address of the problems created in society by a specific 
logic of distribution based on the premise that money and wealth are their 
own creative agents, thus obfuscating the fact that money comes from the 
exploitation of labor and the creation of debt. He thus addressed the cap­
tivity of the economy and the compliance of the state to the mythological 
power of money and the creation of debt. His central premise was that 
the surplus signified either by interest or by profit comes from the work, 
needs, and toil of the debtor/buyer. While quips about material wealth, 
usury, interests, avarice, and greed have been a staple in the vitriol of 
Franciscans and Dominicans for centuries, Luther does not remain on 
the common moralistic ground that simply treats the concept of money 
with contempt in order to redirect believers toward higher “religious” val­
ues—as seen from Augustine onward. He can and does condemn in the 
harshest words usurers and merchants by stating, “Merchants can hardly 
be without sin (Ecclesiasticus. 26 :29), the love of money is the root of all 
evils (I Tim. 6:10),”31 and “Merchants think they are gods.”32 But then he 
moves further by unlocking the mystifying qualities of money as resting 
in the exploitation of the neighbor’s losses, needs, wants, and labor. “You 
cannot make money just with money,”33 Luther notes, underscoring the 
perverse machinations of avarice and greed that result in speculation and 
profits which undergird a new sphere of exchanges, the capitalist market.
In a revealing passage Luther describes the mechanism of profit and 
the “free market” of supply and demand resting on the exploitation of 
wants and needs:
When once the rogue’s eye and greedy belly of a merchant 
find that people must have his wares, or that the buyer is poor 
and needs them, he takes advantage of him and raises the 
price. He considers not the value of the goods, or what his 
own efforts and risk have deserved, but only the other man’s 
[sic] want and need. . . . Because of his avarice, therefore, 
the goods must be priced as much higher as the greater need 
of the other fellow will allow, so that the neighbor’s need be­
comes as it were the measure of the good’s worth and value. 40
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And with a note of indignation he asks:
Tell me, isn’t that an un-Christian and inhuman thing to do?
Isn’t that the equivalent to selling a poor man his own need in 
the same transaction? When he has to buy his wares at a higher 
price because of his need, that is the same as having to buy his 
own need; for what is sold to him is not simply the wares as 
they are, but the wares plus the fact that he must have them.34
But while want and need may explain the occasion for the profit of 
the merchant, it does not describe yet the source for enacting the ex­
change between the buyer and the seller. That, for Luther, is labor, the 
labor of the buyer, who with his toil provides a surplus of value that the 
wares or goods do not inherently possess. The capitalist “sucks up the 
other’s blood and sweat.”35 Here lies Luther’s tour de force which comes 
to him by carefully analyzing the practice of Rentenkauf or Zinskaup6 
and defining it as an extraction of labor through debt: “Thus, when I buy 
zinss [the right to collect a return] on a specified piece of land, I buy not 
the land but the zinss payer’s toil and effort on that land, by which he is 
to bring me my zinss [return].”37
Commenting on Luther’s sermon, the German Marxist historian Ger­
hard Brendler points out that “for the first time in the history of economic 
thought Luther exposed the fact that the creditor purchased the work of 
the borrower and that the interest on the money lent did not come out of 
some magic power of money or from the natural fertility of a mortgaged 
farm: it came from the work of the borrower.”™ Karl Marx himself credits 
Luther with this novel insight, calling him “the oldest German political 
economist,” and quotes him at length to disprove the idea of “capital as 
a spontaneous source of value and its creation,” or “the idea of capital as 
a self-reproducing and thereby self-expanding value, lasting and growing 
eternally by virtue of its inherent power.”39
Luther’s tirades against the early practices of capitalism point to two 
fronts: One is the properly Christian attitude toward it, firmly rooted in 
the parenetic dimension of the Gospel that for the Christian, as a bearer 
of Christ, comes not as an external demand or law but flows, forth as 
a spontaneous practice in the encounter with the neighbor.40 Luther’s 
injunctions as to how goods ought to be exchanged by Christians may 
sound utterly naive, but they spell out the proper form of exchange—in 
principle applicable to all spheres of human existence—as patterned by 
the “exchange” between God and humanity enacted in Christ: Here the
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“debtor” (the sinner) is met not by the exacting demands of the “Great 
Creditor” (God), but by God’s own self-giving in exchange for human­
ity’s losses. It is God’s own Self—namely, Christ—which is given as a 
free gift in lieu of the lack that traverses humanity’s very being. In sum, 
God’s own economy coincides with God’s own Being, where God does 
not demand repayment in the sense of a “fair” exchange between human 
virtues and good works for God’s grace and salvation. On the contrary, 
the very rules of a ‘fair’ exchange where supply meets demand is abol­
ished. This is the “happy exchange,”41 a cornerstone in Luther’s entire 
theology, which in turn patterns the exchange of Christians with other 
Christians, even with the enemy or stranger.
Luther sincerely believed that confessing Christ implied, in the ma­
terial realm of exchanges of God’s gifts, an engagement with one or all 
of the four “Christian ways of exchanging external goods with others”42: 
to let the other steal our property, to give freely to anyone who needs 
it, to lend without expecting anything in return, and to exchange goods 
through the buying and selling for hard cash or payment in kind.45 In 
other words, Christian communities are spaces of “communist” prac­
tices where exchanges and commerce are not ruled by the logic of 
capital-making through exploitation of labor, be that through the finan­
cial mechanisms of surety, interest-based credit, or selling commodities 
“as dear as one can.”44
But then comes the unavoidable question: Does not the world be­
come open for the wicked and the idle, for the dispossession of everything 
through lying and cheating, cunning and violence?45 It is a fact that those 
who are ruled by the Gospel, although robust in faith, are left in a fragile 
situation in the spheres of exchange, vulnerable to every type of abuse 
and injustice. Were the world to be just ruled according to the Gospel, 
Luther repeatedly argues, it would become a desert, peace would vanish, 
and trade and society would be destroyed. In other words, although the 
Gospel is fragile as a means of ordering society, it is robust in its ability 
to transform subjects and create community. The weakness of the Gospel 
lies in its means of transformation—love of the neighbor and enemy, as 
exposed in the Sermon on the Mount. The Gospel can neither compel 
nor enforce its injunctions on those whose subjectivity and practices are 
captive to another “god.” Thus Luther’s understanding of the role of law 
and secular authority serves as a necessary “anti-fragile” strategy. The 
fact that Christians are rare (and will be rare compared to non-believers)
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and that the world is still God’s good creation despite being held captive 
by sin led Luther to expound on a theology of the three orders and two 
regiments as an antidote to abuse, exploitation, and injustice for the sake 
of creation as a whole. We shall return to this in the third section.
Schuld, works righteousness, and gift: the conflict of codes
Revisiting Luther’s thinking in light of Walter Benjamin’s theses, one 
can risk the following hypotheses:
1. As Benjamin sustains, the new economic practices described 
and criticized by Luther can be theologically (and not just ethically) 
approached when those are considered as manifestations of the basic 
structure of a religion grounded in Schuld. Luther’s initial confrontation 
with Rome had little to do with cosmetic reforms of religious practices 
and liturgy but with a cancellation of the classical “sacrificial” economy 
of signs where the human subject is always in debt with his “Provid­
er,” which resulted in the well-known scheme of works and the selling 
of indulgences. This theological economy created a perpetual state of 
indebtedness where the more grace was poured, the more of a debtor 
one became. This scheme of nature and grace provided the theological 
template for the legitimization of new monetary practices—one where 
creditor and debtor, God and sinner, engaged in a (capitalist) transac­
tional scheme. The Scholastic version of Christianity erected a system of 
objects where signs could be exchanged like commodities (i.e., virtues for 
grace). Hence Luther’s theological injunctions against capitalist practices 
were forged not merely by an ethical indignation, but also by a theological 
reversal of a system of exchangeable and negotiable signs by a code based 
on Christ as gift—not as Creditor. Hence Luther’s attack upon current 
church practices (indulgences), scholasticism (works righteousness), 
and capitalism. All are different expressions of the same code.
2. The cancellation of this economy of signs is theologically enacted 
by Luther’s transformation of the code of exchange. Luther introduces an 
economy of symbols that is based on the reality of gift. The paramount 
expression of this shift is embedded in his theology of the cross where the 
frohlich wechsel gives something (Christ) in lieu of nothing (sin, debt). 
This implies a total remittance of Schuld, thus breaking a (demonic) 
mechanism of asymmetries. The articulation of the Law-Gospel modes 
of addressing the human situation expresses this: While the Law teaches 
what we ought to do, the Gospel teaches what we ought to receive; while
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the Law is the taskmaster that demands that we work and that we give, 
the Gospel grants freely and only commands to receive what is offered. 
Thus, “if the Gospel is a gift and offers a gift, it does not demand any­
thing.”46
3 . Luther employs this theological template as a critical weapon 
against capitalist practices. The lender, speculator, and usurer do not 
enact God’s own economy but that of the Devil by producing (material) 
indebtedness as a permanent state of being—parallel to the spiritual 
indebtedness generated by the church’s theology and practice. In other 
words, the Devil (or the demonic) is the mirror image of God (though 
a shadowy one) where the terms of the transaction are symmetrically 
reversed: While God gives, thus creating the phenomenology of the 
receiver, the demon demands, creating the phenomenology of the 
exactable—namely, the exploitable. The way in which the spiritual realm 
is structured is thus echoed in the secular realm. Hence, for Luther the 
problem of capital formation was not just an ethical matter, but a deeply 
theological one. In fact, God’s own Being as donum, gift, love, grace, was 
at stake.
4 . Capitalist practices are an embodiment of self-seeking gain, in di­
rect opposition to Christ’s (and the Christian’s) self-giving presence. It 
is an infringement of the first commandment to center one’s whole self 
and one’s whole personality not only upon earthly realities, which lack 
ultimacy and cannot fulfill the human vocation, but also on the active ex­
ploitation of the neighbor’s needs and wants. Thus the heart which clings 
to Mammon is grounded in a demonic trust, for it seeks to fulfill its desire 
through an idol/demon.
5. Benjamin’s theses that capitalism draws from Christianity enough 
mythical elements in order to constitute its own myth and that capital­
ism developed parasitically on Christianity are thus confirmed as long 
as Christianity is understood as a system of exchangeable signs along 
the lines of Creditor-debtor. Benjamin’s thesis is thus not applicable to a 
religion that responds to the problem of Schuld through justification by 
grace without works, or through what is the same, the total remittance 
of debt.
In sum, capitalism for Luther can be considered as a (demonic) reli­
gion in that it replicates in the secular domain the same logic found in the 
church dominated by the anti-Christ. It is grounded, indeed, on faith— 
but not on faith in Christ. Instead, it is grounded in a trust that “disrupts” 4
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personality (Tillich) and eschews the whole fabric of existence. In short, 
it is grounded in a mechanism of dispossession.
We need to explore Luther’s distinction of three orders and two reg­
iments as a strategy able to deal with evil and abuse. If capitalism can be 
regarded as a religion, then another religious formulation is what can 
offer an initial critique. Yet this religion must be able to articulate a sphere 
that is liberated from the code of exchanges patterned by capital (i.e., the 
spiritual) and at the same time claims the spaces ruled by capital (i.e., the 
secular). This is what I term Luther’s “anti-fragile” strategy, which refers 
not to God’s direct rule (the Gospel) but to God’s governance refracted 
by the abiding presence of the sinful, unjust, and demonic. God operates 
in these instances mediated by spheres of production and distribution 
that can never escape the very randomness and opacity of life, hence the 
necessary coercive nature of the institutional mediation of God’s rule. Or, 
to put it in more positive terms, God’s rule through law and institutions 
exacts (or harnesses) energy from the demonic for the sake of creation. 
In the secular domain, the point is not to directly eradicate the demonic 
but to constrain its effects.
Before that, however, we need to understand the contours of contem­
porary capitalism in order to grasp the mythical associations that money 
has acquired by mimicking the dynamics present in any religion: Not only 
is capitalism sustained by a trust placed in the endless thirst for profits, 
but it also reflects a strategy of keeping the subject away from the core of 
his/her subjectivity—a desperate attempt to cover up a gap at the core 
of human existence. Contemporary critiques of capitalism will show that 
the ultimate problem that we are facing is situated at a “religious” level, 
meaning the representation and construction of subjectivity which at­
tempts to find the center of the subject outside of itself in the circulation 
of commodities in which money acts as the supreme broker and mediator 
(i.e., Mammon). This is the symptom of a humanity that is unable to ar­
ticulate itself in a meaningful chain of significations.
The Market State: The New Face of Globalized Capitalism
Valuation and financial capital: In endless profits wc trust
The relation between faith and a new configuration of subjective 
expectations is what here must hold our attention. This becomes more 
significant as we move into the state of our present world-system, which 
is purely sustained by a fiduciary alchemy that may be the envy of fading
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religious traditions. Faith and trust are recurring categories employed at 
the moment of explaining the bizarre mechanisms that govern our con­
temporary world of social relations based on endless profit or gain.47
Profits and endless gains are established—especially in late financial 
capitalism—through the differential relationship between signs indicat­
ing the “value” of stocks, securities, etc., apparently in relation to how 
profitable a company or economic activity is. However, this operation of 
valuation is not simply the result of a rational and critical evaluation of the 
actual performance of companies and their actual profits, since many of 
the companies do not pay dividends on a regular basis, and some of the 
most valuable stocks relate to economic activities which do not present 
any profit at all. Other factors appear in the capitalist valuation process 
which are not linked directly to the present performance of a company, 
fund, or asset. The sociologist Manuel Castells suggests that two factors 
appear to dominate this valuation process: trust and expectations. If there 
is no trust in the institutional environment in which value-making oper­
ates, then it cannot be translated into financial value. But if this trust is in 
place, then what creates value is the potential future value of a stock. In 
other words, it is the expected growth of financial value that is the rule of 
thumb for investment in the new economy.48
How are these expectations created? Here is where faith and trust 
come in, for it is largely a subjective process made up of a vague vi­
sion of the future, some insider knowledge, conscious image-making, 
information turbulences generated by geopolitical and economic events, 
announcements by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, personal moods 
of bank chairpersons or ministers of finance, valuations from respect­
ed firms, and herd behavior. But as Castells indicates, this is not to say 
that all valuation can be reduced to subjective moods, yet even the most 
objective factors are always assessed from a subjective valuation and ex­
pectation. He writes:
The performance of companies, supply and demand, mac­
ro-economic indicators [the “objective” factors], interact with 
various sources of information in an increasingly unpredict­
able pattern, where valuations may be ultimately decided by 
random combinations of a multiplicity of factors recombining 
at increasing levels of complexity, as the speed and volume of 
transactions continue to accelerate.49 46
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This illustrates that the new stage of financial capitalism “brings the 
information technology and the technology of information together in the 
creation of value out of our belief in the value we create.”50 As mentioned, 
value-making is essentially the product of the financial market. Money, 
which used to be anchored in the “real economy” as a universal equiva­
lent in the exchange of all commodities, has been displaced as a means to 
become an end in itself: the only true commodity. This is the triumph, as 
Slavoj Zizek notes, of the virtual economy where financial capital func­
tions as a purely virtual notion processing real people.51
In effect, in capitalism, exploitation is thoroughly naturalized, 
inscribed into the functioning of every social relation. People, goods, com­
modities, nature, symbols, and even hopes and expectations are churned 
by a voracious information-processing that is almost completely out of 
control. If value-making is essentially a product of the financial market, 
to reach this market and vie for higher value in it makes of the ends of 
economic activity just a means. It is not that value is the result of eco­
nomic relations (just or unjust), but now labor, innovation, production, 
management, and image-making are a function of the market. As Castells 
soberly states, “While the whirlwind of factors entering in the valuation 
process are ultimately expressed in financial value (always uncertain), 
throughout the process of reaching this critical judgment, managers and 
workers (that is, people) end up producing and consuming our material 
world—including the images that shape it and make it.”52
Likewise Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe the present state 
of capitalism as a total event. They point out that
society has become a factory, or rather, capitalist production 
has spread such that the labor power of the entire society 
tends to be subordinated to capitalist control. Capital increas­
ingly exploits the entire range of our productive capacities, 
our bodies and our minds, our capacities for communication, 
our intelligence and creativity, our affective relations with 
each other, and more. Life itself has been put to work.53
This is a new form of totalitarianism in the sense that it is not merely the 
tyranny of one sphere upon the other, but the successful production of sub­
jectivities according to the economy of desires and the exploitation of fears. 
The sacrificial logic reaches its zenith here. As Benjamin asserts, “therein 
lies the historical enormity of capitalism,” namely, in that “religion [i.e., 
capitalism] is no longer the reform of being, but rather its obliteration.”54
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The incessant circulation of commodities as signs
But faith or trust in the providential powers of the market and the 
expectation of the miracle of money creating more money are not by 
themselves enough to explain the complex workings of late financial and 
consumer capitalism. Keeping Benjamin’s thesis in mind, capitalism can 
be regarded as a religion not on the basis of a metaphysical construct or a 
set of rituals, but in that it “essentially serves to satisfy the same worries, 
anguish, and disquiet formerly answered by so-called religion.” Yet this 
satisfaction operates in a complex web of significations that latch onto 
an ontological lack at the core of human existence. In other words, it is 
a sign system devised to conceal the fact that humanity is marked by an 
ontological incompleteness.
Here we approach the question as to what makes capitalism tick. 
Walter Benjamin has already anticipated an answer by pointing out the 
negative pole that capitalism seeks to address (e.g., worries, anguish, and 
disquiet). We have also seen that these predicaments were codified un­
der the master-code of Schuld (guilt/debt), from which a semiotic array 
unfolded where the signs of work, law, production, sacrifice, profit, and 
wages served to signify the means for the cancellation of this debt. It is 
this dimension that escaped the otherwise insightful critique of Marx, 
because it is a matter that points to the very ontological incompleteness 
of humanity that cannot be grasped through an economicist-materialist 
analysis. One must enter a realm where the theological, the ontological, 
and the psychological overlap.
In this vein, the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard has advanced a 
powerful critique of the Western tendency of thought centered upon the 
sign of “production.” He states, “Everywhere man has learned to reflect 
on himself, to assume himself, to posit himself according to this scheme 
of production, which is assigned to him as the ultimate dimension of value 
and meaning.”55 While in traditional (liberal) political economy the hu­
man being is conceptualized as a producing animal (or as a tool-making 
animal), Marx’s claim wanted to liberate humanity’s productive potential 
without ever confronting the anthropological “phantasm” of the human 
being continually deciphering herself through her works. Labor was 
equated with human essence, an “aberrant sanctification” of work that 
shows Marx’s entrapment in theological thought.56 To whatever extent 
Marx was able to demystify the liberal abuse of the concept of humanity 
as work, he still regarded the working class with the same productivistic 48
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code. Both liberal and Marxist conceptions of human nature share a com­
mon presupposition: Its fulfillment lies in the unleashing of labor power 
through the conquest of nature. Baudrillard writes:
The system of political econoiny does not produce only the 
individual as labor power that is sold and exchanged: it pro­
duces the very conceptions of labor power as the fundamental 
human potential. More deeply than in the fiction of the indi­
vidual freely selling his labor power in the market, the system 
is rooted in the identification of the individual with his labor 
power and with his act of transforming nature according to 
human ends. In a work, man [s/c] is not only quantitatively 
exploited as a productive force by the system of capitalist po­
litical economy, but is also metaphysically overdetermined as 
a producer by the code of political economy. . . . And in this 
Marxism assists the cunning of capital. It convinces men that 
they are alienated by the sale of their labor power, thus cen­
soring the much more radical hypothesis that they might be 
alienated as labor power, as the “inalienable” power of creat­
ing value by their labor.57
The point made by Baudrillard is that classical economy and Marx 
operate within a representational discourse, blind to the new form of social 
exchanges enacted by capitalism: the political economy of the sign that 
separates the signifier (a language term) from the signified (an intended 
meaning or image) and its material referent (an object pointed to by the 
signifier). The key for him is to understand the semiological structure of 
the circulation of commodities where the act of consumption is totally di­
vorced from the use-value or utility of the object, inscribed instead by either 
prestige or desire. In other words, the center of the contemporary system 
is no longer the process of material production, but the political economy 
of the play of signs.58 Consumption—and not production for the satisfac­
tion of hypothetical needs—has become the chief basis of the social order: 
It structures (i.e., encode) behavior and groups through a linguistic sign 
function. In sum, consumer objects constitute a system of signs that dif­
ferentiate the population by the transference of meaning to the individual 
consumer. Literally, the act of consumption is a digestion of signs.
Consumer goods are best understood as “a network of floating sig­
nifies that are inexhaustible in their ability to incite desire.”59 Thus a 
disturbing reversal is produced, for capitalism has let loose the genie in
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the bottle: No longer is the bourgeoisie seen as exploiting the labor of 
the worker, nor does the worker experience estrangement as he or she is 
forced to sell his or her labor in the market. A new system has emerged 
where the commodity, detached from any social utility, exploits by way 
of evoking and seducing the hidden desires of humanity. We live “in the 
period of the objects . . .  we live by their rhythm, according to their in­
cessant cycles.” Thus, “objects are no longer tied to function or to a 
defined need. This is precisely because objects respond to something dif­
ferent, either to a social logic, or to a logic of desire, where they serve as 
a fluid and unconscious field of signification.”60 Humans end up being 
consumed by objects, rather than consuming objects themselves.
What is this social logic or logic of desire? How are these related to 
Schulcl? It should be apparent by now that the systems of signs structured 
around capitalism (i.e., endless profits) and consumerism (i.e., endless 
metabolism) are not only imbricated, but also constitute a new language 
through which something else speaks. Or rather, through which we are 
spoken. Baudrillard writes that
the world of objects and of needs would thus be a world of 
general hysteria. Just as the organs and the functions of the 
body in hysterical conversion become a gigantic paradigm 
which the symptom replaces and refers to, in consumption 
objects become a vast paradigm designating another language 
through which something else speaks. We could add that the 
evanescence and continual mobility reaches a point where it 
becomes impossible to determine the specific objectivity of an 
illness, for the simple reason that it does not exist. The flight 
from one signifier to another is no more than the surface re­
ality of a desire, which is insatiable because it is founded on 
a lack. And this desire, which can never be satisfied, signifies 
itself locally in a succession of objects and needs.61
Desire and consumption are just the “hysterical symptoms” through 
which the “demonic” speaks in our contemporary, secularized environ­
ment. Schuld is thus externalized by the perpetual circularity and flow 
of signs that can never cover the hole that lies at the core of human 
subjectivity, the incompleteness of being. Money-making out of thin air, 
like consumerism of material or virtual sensations,62 rests on the same 
premise: the filling of a void that is not material, but ontological. Schuld 
as debt feeds on Schuld as guilt: Both are grounded, to paraphrase Til- 50
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lich, in the distortion of being whose subjective moment is the distortion 
of personality.
Baudrillard’s analysis helps us on three fronts. Firstly, by unveiling 
a psychological and anthropological fragility that has been encoded as a 
system of free-floating signs, we notice that there is a lack at the core of 
human existence which is exploited ad nauseam by advanced, consumer 
capitalism. This lack is the ultimate language which “speaks” through its 
hysterical symptoms, pointing to a distortion that abides at the core of the 
human psyche—yet is always encoded in a social web of significations.
This approach is similar to Zizek’s concept of the traumatic core at the 
heart of the ontological event of being human. The Slovene philosopher 
sees the problem of the production and representation of subjectivity as the 
core predicament exploited by the capitalist strategy. In line with the theo­
logical argument made by both Luther and Tillich, Zizek maintains that the 
status of the subject is always processual; that is, it emerges only through 
the failure to fully actualize itself. When a subject tries to articulate itself 
in a signifying chain, this articulation inevitably fails. But it is precisely in 
this failure that the subject as such emerges, which is to say, the subject is 
the failure of its signifying representation.65 This is what capital as religion 
desperately attempts to conceal, thus fueling the engine of desires and the 
mystification of money as a way of actualizing human essence. But as we 
saw, it doesn’t actualize anything; it actually consumes.
In both cases the capitalist system of signs acquires a religious aura 
since the perpetual unleashing (or production) of desires is allowed to 
present itself as salvation through consumption, enjoyment, accumulation 
of sensations, and happiness. This is the soteriological dimension of con­
sumer capitalism, which, as in the case of the medieval church, evokes and 
manipulates demands (i.e., desires) for which it presents itself as the sole 
supplier. Thus the glittering and glamorous aesthetics of our late-modern 
shoppingscapes, commercials, and images are needed to conceal the fact 
that the satisfaction attained by fleeting consumption is no more than a 
pseudo-satisfaction that is “superficially exciting but hollow at its core.”64 
The system is rigged by this mechanism, whereby the consumption of one 
sign (i.e., commodity) automatically elicits a referential relation to other 
signs that needs to be had. The bonfire of the vanities is endlessly fanned.
The second front opened by Baudrillard’s post-structural approach 
to the economy of signs is that the logic of desire turns out to be based 
on the social and psychological need for differentiation, a desire for so-
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cial meaning over and against other consumers of signs. One cannot live 
within an economy of signs without the referential differentiation of signs 
from other signs. This has been observed in the Latin American sce­
nario by the Argentinian anthropologist Nestor Garcia Canclini in the 
way he traces the passage from citizens to consumers.65 While consump­
tion is not merely passive but active, the concept of citizenship has been 
displaced by the practice of consumption—the primordial referent for 
identity. Thus consumption is not an equalizer of social difference, but 
rather a deepening of social distinctions.
Last but not least, Baudrillard’s analysis unveils the essential prob­
lem inscribed at the core of present financial capitalism: When desire 
rather than need ends up driving the market, commodities themselves 
become consuming, as do their images—images ultimately designed to 
promote further consumption (simulacra). The epitome of this process 
is the present network-computerized financial economy, where money 
codified as signs in reference to other signs is completely divorced from 
the real conditions of production and consumption. This marks the com­
plete virtualization of money, a commodity that only exists as a sign; 
something that has to be “believed.” And if money makes money in this 
virtual machine, then it makes sense to borrow more virtual money to 
make more money. Few of the so-called entrepreneurs and job-creators 
really own any substantial amount of money; they simply borrow—which 
is to say, they are masters of sign-manipulation and speculation, the key 
to success in late-financial capitalism.
At this point we can return to both Luther’s and Tillich’s concep­
tion of faith as trust and its relation to the formation of subjectivity. For 
what stems from our analysis so far is that we are not facing just a set of 
objective coordinates obeying rigid historical laws, but the very produc­
tion of subjectivities that rest on mythical and psychological mechanisms 
whose symptom is capitalism-as-religion. Schuld is at the root of this 
phenomenon and fuels an endless circulation, where fleeting signs (i.e., 
commodities) serve as the catalysts for “solving” the human problem: its 
utter disjunction, estrangement, lack. Hardt and Negri pose the scenario 
as to what type of subjectivity the total market has created. Not only has 
neoliberalism shifted the terms of economic and political life, but it has 
also “operated a social, anthropological transformation, fabricating new 
figures of subjectivity,” and the leading figure produced is that of the 
indebted. 66 With this we return to Luther. 52
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Luther’s Anti-fragile Strategy:
Three Simultaneous Ways of Christian Living
As indicated in the first section, Luther’s theological injunctions 
against capitalist practices were forged not merely by an ethical indig­
nation, but by a theological reversal of a system of exchangeable and 
negotiable signs structured by the master-code of God-as-Creditor for 
one centered in Christ as gift. Hence his attack upon current church 
practices (indulgences), scholasticism (works righteousness), and cap­
italism (indebtedness): All are different expressions of the same code of 
Schuld. For in effect, the drive to maximize gain, the search for self-ag­
grandizement, or the quest to earn one’s salvation, are all manifestations 
of the same instinct born from the desire to affirm the self in face of 
the empirical limits that bind finite existence. For this reason, Luther re­
garded the practices of early capitalism (e.g., debt, interest, usury) as 
idolatrous and demonic. For him, money and economy, and market and 
labor, were theological matters in the sense that these describe fields in 
which both the human and God realize their being— God as giver, the 
human as receiver. If, for Luther, true faith means that “we are to trust in 
God alone and turn to him, expecting from him only good things; for it is 
he who gives us body, life, food, drink, nourishment, health, protection, 
peace, and all temporal and eternal blessings,” capitalism—codified as 
Mammon—is the replacement of God-as-giver by the power and mech­
anisms of money, whose blessings are allocated on the basis of “merit.”
The analysis of contemporary critiques of capitalism has shown that 
the ultimate problem we are facing is situated at a “religious” level (i.e., 
the representation of subjectivity as one more sign within the circulation of 
commodities in which money acts as the supreme arbiter, broker, redeem­
er) . Furthermore, the foregoing analysis has also demonstrated that both 
the efficacy and the appeal of money is grounded in the old religious axiom 
of Schuld—guilt and debt. The problem that we face is therefore twofold: 
On the one hand is the predicament of the signification and representation 
of subjectivity— namely, how the subject can be dislodged from the virtual 
play of referential signs that end up consuming the subject as such by pos­
iting that Schuld is a necessary mediation for attaining plenitude of being. 
On the other hand, there is a problem as to how the historical, political, and 
economic existence that is crisscrossed by the inherently processual fragil­
ity of the subject can in fact be contained in its deleterious social effects 
without the recourse to totalitarian or oppressive measures.
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The Apocalypse of God, faith, and the self: Living from the end of times
Christianity approaches the first problem, the subject chained to 
Schuld, by a radical understanding of faith as an apocalyptic event taking 
place in the chain of significations that constitute the subject as such. This 
marks an end, yet also a beginning. It is marked by a struggle between 
ego and a new self (Christ) as expounded in Paul’s enigmatic words in 
Galatians 2 :20 : “Nevertheless, I live; yet not I, but Christ lives in me.”67 
Righteousness and faith are not the outcome of hard work on the basis 
of our substantial potentialities and attributes, but the acceptance and 
integration of an “alien” perspectival stance in the very symbolic web that 
constitutes subjectivity.
The understanding of subjectivity as a symbolic and perspectival 
event implies that we don’t possess a substantial reality called “ego” or 
“consciousness” which produces symbols, but rather, consciousness as 
such is the result of symbolic linkages. The ego and consciousness are 
thus a virtual world that in Paul’s and Luther’s case comprises a battle­
field where an old historical trajectory (represented by Law and sin) dies 
and a new life begins (represented by faith and Christ). For Luther, Paul’s 
statement, “I live; yet not I, but Christ lives in me,” is the center of his 
proclamation of the righteousness of Christ—a righteousness by which 
Christ lives in us and which, de facto, introduces a split in our existence, 
as well as our consciousness.
It is clear that for Luther the righteousness of Christ denotes not only 
a forensic event, but an existential and psychological transition by which 
an “alien” life is lived as one’s own. Christ is the symbol for a new social 
and relational reinscription of the person, a symbolic order that is unan­
chored from a world that pits the person against its own ego, other egos, 
and God. Ego is eminently relational, but it is trapped in the wrong set of 
perspectives by virtue of a faulty symbolic articulation creating the illusion 
that the ego is its own person or substance—namely, that it can attain 
the resources for its own realization. Law, works, and ego reinforce each 
other, spiraling in recursive circularity around not simply a “lack,” but 
an unquenchable desire to conceal and cover up such a gap. This is what 
creates the world of Schuld, for, in effect, if the ego is conceived as the 
agent whose vocation is to arrive at fulfillment and completion through 
means that in principle are not intrinsic, yet instrumentally at its disposal, 
then the world of objectivities (other human beings, nature, etc.) can only 
appear as means that are sought as erasures of an incompleteness that is
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endemic to the ego. Life becomes, thus, a mechanism not only of accu­
mulation, but of dispossession through Schuld. God as the Big-Other/ 
Creditor, or the human being as a homo oeconomicus whose epitome is 
the financist/capitalist, are just two variations of the same trope.
Paul’s expression “not I, but Christ lives in me” implies for Luther 
a new environment that literally rearranges the phenomenal self of the 
Christian. But in doing so, it unleashes a new identity that is expressed 
in the praxis of living. Not only is Christ “fixed and cemented to me and 
abides in me” in a purely virtual realm, but it is also the case that Christ 
is the name for the transition between virtuality and actuality, since “the 
life that I now live, He lives in me. Indeed, Christ Himself is the life that 
I now live. In this way, therefore, Christ and I are one.”68 Christ forms 
the very life that I now live, a new environment that is disclosed when 
one is pulled out of one’s “own skin.” All of Christ’s attributes—grace, 
righteousness, life, peace, and salvation—now appear as cemented to 
one’s own existence. When one divides one’s own person from Christ’s, 
one falls back into the old environment, that of the Law and the power of 
the demonic.
The accent upon the new identity of the self in Christ is what ulti­
mately embodies the biggest challenge to the understanding of the ego 
as the outcome of the consumption of signs. It tackles the issue at its 
root, namely, by shifting the code of consumption and debt for that of 
the gift. It creates a liberated environment where one is free to love the 
neighbor without falling into the mechanisms of Schuld, without seeking 
to “consume” the other on the basis of his/her debt and guilt. This free­
dom elicited by faith turns the subject outwardly in a twofold manner: as 
a giving praxis in the midst of needs and wants, and thus as a “cynical” 
critique of the selfish motivations that structure daily living and the pre­
vailing ideology informing our culture. Yet this praxis is grounded in a 
total passivity, the passivity that results from the new perspectival stance 
where God comes to us not as the Big Creditor but as gift. This move­
ment is redoubled in the life of the Christian as the death of an old ego, 
its semiotic web, and the birth of the new self. This is the strategy that 
Luther called “spiritual,” living from the end times as shaped by the event 
of Christ as gift (justification by faith). In other words, it outlines a new 
political economy of the gift, received and embodied in renewed subjects 
gathered in that community we call church.
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Luther’s conception of the three orders: Living between the times
Yet Luther was aware that this transformation of the subject is never 
completed in this life, and furthermore, the radical appeal of the Gos- 
pel has a limited reach (Christians are rare and few, even in the midst 
of Christendom!). The “gospelling”69 of human existence through the 
economy of the gift does not provide the efficacious means to govern a 
world that is crisscrossed by the forces that promise the ego another type 
of fulfilment. This leads to a second strategy, which Luther developed in 
his theology of the three orders and two regiments as God’s own indef­
inite delay of the final apocalyptic occurrence in history. This strategy 
incorporates the former one, yet places it within the historical tension of 
living between times, where God shares the stage with the demonic. The 
latter cannot be directly eliminated, because it is parasitic on God’s good 
creation: Only God’s addressing human beings through law (revealing 
a gap, a lack, a hole) can contain, restrict, and curb the demonic ruse. 
While the demonic cannot be unswervingly obliterated without endan­
gering God’s own creation, it can indirectly be restrained, contained, and 
even sapped of its energies through a proper strategy of constraint. And 
while the economy is the ultimate abode of the demonic, it is the political 
which is able to restrain its venom—or let it loose in the veins of society. 
This is the “secular,” anti-fragile strategy developed by Luther, which 
corresponds to an existence placed between the times.
Let us proceed to observe how the living between the times or “re­
formist” strategy looks in the face of the capitalist predicament outlined 
before. It is well known that Luther horizontalized the classical medieval 
hierarchical and organic distinction between ecclesia (church), politici 
(public realm), and oeconomia (household) by decoupling them from 
distinct castes or classes. While maintaining their distinctive features, 
Luther ingeniously argued that all human beings participate in these 
spheres and their institutions. Vitor Westhelle has demonstrated how the 
Aristotelian categories of poiesis and praxis may have informed Luther’s 
conception of the range of human activities composed by the spheres of 
economy and politics. While poiesis denotes an activity whose outcome 
is the production of something, praxis refers to an intersubjective effect 
which does not necessarily result in a “material” outcome.
The economy is thus the sphere of a “metabolic” activity of self-pro­
duction between human beings and nature, the realm of the forces of 
production that seeks to provide the objective means for the sustenance
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and reproduction of life. The political, on the other hand, comprises the 
sphere of intersubjective relations of production, which “constitutes it­
self as explanatory narrative and public communication”— the medium 
of human communicative action, moral deliberation, and juridical legis­
lation.70 While poiesis (economy) deals directly with the conditions that 
allow for the creation, sustenance, and reproduction of human life, praxis 
(politics) deals directly with the virtual/symbolic conditions that regulate 
the exchanges among human beings. Both are realms of power, yet they 
function differently. The church, however, distinguishes itself from the 
other two spheres in that humanity does not produce anything here; no 
activity of self-representation is enacted. In this instance, our mode of 
being is not that of action, but that of re-action,71 namely, our response 
to God’s address which is both virtual (Word) and material (sacraments). 
It is important to note, however, that God’s activity in the church does 
not happen in a vacuum, but is intertwined with the other two spheres, 
vicinities to which the addressees already belong and from which they 
cannot extricate themselves.
Another way to interpret Luther’s understanding of the three orders 
or mandates is to approach them not just from the productive code (cf. 
Baudrillard) but from the distributive one. It refers to a pluralistic view 
of distribution, where each sphere obeys different rules. This does not 
replace the “productivist” model referred to above, but complements it 
by emphasizing that human beings are not just the subjects or objects 
of production (active producers and passive consumers); they are also 
subjects and objects of the distribution of both virtual and material goods. 
Furthermore, what is allocated, shared, or exchanged in the process of 
distribution are not just the fruits of physical labor, but also the fruits 
of the mind and emotions. As the political philosopher Michael Walzer 
notes, “People conceive and create goods, which they then distribute 
among themselves.”72 Goods do not appear out of thin air, nor do in­
dividuals distribute them according to a homogeneous general principle 
such as free exchange, desert, or need. Rather, goods and their particular 
social meanings are the central medium of social relations. Before goods 
come into physical hands, they are already inscribed in people’s minds. 
Thus the distribution of these goods is already conditioned by shared 
conceptions of their meaning and their utility. Distributive agents, there­
fore, are already constrained by the goods they hold, to the point that one 
may say that “goods distribute themselves among people”75 according to
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social rules, desires, wants, needs, and mores that outline specific spheres 
of distribution according to explicit criteria.
However, it is one thing to speak theoretically about the (relative) 
distributive autonomy within each particular sphere; it is another to ex­
perience the way these spheres actually function in society. The reality 
is that these spheres are constantly violated. This becomes particular­
ly clear when we consider that “most societies are organized on what 
we may think of as a social version of the gold standard: one good or 
one set of goods is dominant and determinative of value in all spheres 
of distribution.”74 When this good or set of goods is monopolized, then 
the individuals or groups possessing this particular good acquire a dis­
proportionate command of a wider range of other goods. While certain 
goods are dominant by their very nature—water in the desert, for in­
stance—in most contexts, the reality of dominance and monopoly is the 
result of an imbricate social and political creation that compounds reality 
and its wants and needs with its symbolic construal. As Walzer notes, 
physical and military strength, familial reputation, religious or political 
office, landed wealth, and capital and technological knowledge have all 
played this role at one point or another in human history. The possession 
of a dominant good means it can automatically be converted into another 
good, thus cementing the sociological symbiosis between the monopoly 
of a dominant social good and the dominance of a ruling class/caste/ 
group atop all the distributive systems. This is tyranny.
What does this have to do with Luther’s view? For the time being, it 
should be apparent that Luther’s understanding of the three “sacred” or­
ders through which God comes to us as a gift acknowledges the legitimacy 
of different criteria of production and distribution in each one of them, 
where producers may dominate in the economic sphere, princes in the 
political, and clergy and theologians in the ecclesiastical. They represent 
three different ways in which God’s gifts—or God’s “comings”—are re­
ceived, used, and abused. It is precisely the reality of abuse (i.e., sin) that 
gives a clear institutional format to these three “comings,” erecting pow­
erful barriers against (a) the domination of one sphere upon the other,
(b) the abusive domination within each sphere (monopoly), and (c) the 
possibility of converting one dominant good into another (tyranny). The 
common denominator of these three instances is fragility. Theologically, 
we would refer to this as sin, and in mythopoeic language, the work of the 
Devil. Luther’s proposal thus addresses the reality and effects of sin in a
58 | Market and Margins
way that allows a society to avoid the temptation of succumbing to mes­
sianic and utopian adventures which would almost certainly attempt to 
intervene directly—-mostly politically—to erase the traces of life’s fragil­
ity. Buttressed by Walzer’s insights, Luther’s theology of the three orders 
thus helps us appreciate the gravity of the present situation, a situation 
marked by the tyranny of financial capital upon all spheres of life.
Spiritual and secular strategics
The culturally and socially pluralistic environment in which we live 
today, compounded by the single rule of capital that undermines every 
other sphere, suggests a double strategy that follows Luther’s distinction 
between the spiritual and the secular. Since capitalism should be seen as 
a (demonic) religion—which is to say, as the construal and production 
of subjectivity based on an economy of signs that seeks to center hu­
man subjectivity in the endless circulation of goods—we can regard the 
Christian church as being engaged in a spiritual-semiotic struggle from 
the point of view of a different code. It is a struggle between faith in the 
God of Israel and faith in Mammon, between expectations regarding a 
promised world and expectations regarding a world of promises, between 
belief and unbelief, between clinging to the Master and clinging to Mas­
terCard. In short, this is the battle around the fabrication of “figures of 
subjectivity” that is always intertwined with the “vicinities” of poiesis and 
praxis.75
This is the proper sphere for the church’s struggle as a creature of an 
economy based on gift in the midst of a world ruled by the economy of 
exchangeable signs. The “demythologization” of capitalism is the present 
struggle of the church, for she is always bound to clash with other tech­
nologies of the self, particularly with those centered in self-production 
through the dispossession of other selves. Thus the simple proclamation 
of the Word to our hearts always has an effect on the spheres that our 
bodies occupy, the spheres in which it both produces and represents itself 
(bodies that are subjectivized by God’s own subjective move). This is the 
political and economic mumis (office, service) and usus (use, exercise, 
practice) of the Gospel. Thus no church can be said to be preaching the 
Gospel today without addressing the problem of the idolatrous faith of 
capitalism. This is a spiritual struggle with political and economic effects, 
for it redraws the foundation of Schuld and the pattern of exchange. It is 
the proclamation of a gift and thus the confession that we don’t believe 
in the market; we believe otherwise, in Christ. This is the new “atheistic”
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face of Christianity, which creates a space where we are given permission 
to not enjoy, to not be happy, to not have to explore all our “potentialities” 
of desire insofar as these are dictated by the capitalist sign-system. This 
is freedom.76
At the same time, the struggle and tension is not apart from but with­
in the other spheres composing our creaturehood. Here the struggle is 
not directly against capitalism per se, but against its tyranny grounded in 
the concept of endless profits. Hence, the problem is not whether or not a 
market should exist, or the place of money within it; the problem is when 
the criterion of distribution within the market (i.e., money in exchange 
for goods and services) becomes the criterion that rules in the other 
spheres. Thus the main focus is neither the economy nor the church, 
but the public sphere, the realm of the commons, governance (politic). 
Luther saw in the State the means of restraining the effects of sin and evil 
in society (neither oeconornia nor ecclesia have these means of restraint). 
Certainly the political sphere and its institutions do not possess the means 
to produce “good” people (only the Gospel can do that).77 Neither does 
the political sphere possess the means for the production and reproduc­
tion of life. But it does have the means to coerce evildoers to do minimally 
a superficial good (or, stated negatively, to not do harm).
During the last few decades, we have witnessed an erosion of both 
the legitimacy of the State, political parties, and democratically elected 
representatives and the active involvement of (democratic) governments 
in the very setting up of the rules, institutions, and powers of neoliberal 
globalization.78 Against the template of Luther’s theology of the two gov­
ernances and the three orders, it becomes apparent how important the 
role of the State is and how crucial a “re-enchantment” of the political 
sphere becomes at this time. Politics, broadly construed, is the only place 
that can furnish the mechanisms for controlling the anarchic forces of 
the market. In other words, only praxis can create the institutional sphere 
where poiesis can regain its role in the sustainment and reproduction of 
life. After all, in Luther’s account, politics came into existence when the 
economy was affected by sin, as stated in his commentary on Genesis.79 
But whose politics? Which State? History shows us that the State—and 
the political parties that have taken turns in its administration—easily 
becomes a prisoner of economic interests when a democratic culture of 
moral deliberation, social control, and rebellion falters. The public space 
constituted by this deliberation and mobilization must debate its moral
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values and vision, as well as serve as the foundation for a political resolve 
to curb the impulse of a socially and economically powerful minority 
through a new regime of democratic representation.
In the meantime, active social policies that deal with the distribu­
tion of income, property, and wealth through a reengineering of tributary 
criteria and processes are a few of the defining characteristics of the 
present (reformist) agenda. It is time that wealth and riches be redistrib­
uted among the spheres of health, education, and culture. Furthermore, 
these same attitudes and practices need to be applied to our current eco­
logical crises. But any reformist strategy must tackle the core issue: the 
regulation of the creation and allocation of money that fuels a financial 
imperialism. The transference of wealth from the poor, the middle class­
es, and the Global South must stop.
One step in this direction would be reform of the banking system. 
Practical measures should include the banning of private banks as the 
monopolizers in the creation of money out of nothing (i.e., debt), clear 
regulation that differentiates investment banks from savings banks, the 
promotion of person-to-person banking as well as cooperatives and credit 
unions, creation of a new international currency that can provide stability 
to world commerce, etc. Nevertheless, these practical measures will be 
ineffectual if they are not accompanied by a strong political will that de­
mocratizes the creation and allocation of money, thereby suppressing the 
“invisible hand” of the market as the final arbiter of wealth and well-be­
ing. But it must further be kept in mind that the new relation between 
capitalism and territoriality signified by a globalized economy must also 
inform our people’s vision and strategies for justice. As mentioned be­
fore, because we participate in a global economic network, we are also 
subjected to social processes that transcend our own groups, classes, and 
nations. What this means in the long run is that a “globalization from 
below” (Gorostiaga)—the international networking of groups and as­
sociations—rconstitutes one of the means for the birth of a democratic 
“geoculture” that would be able to cast a new vision for life in this planet.
Bifurcations: Living at the end of (a) time
The above is just the description of an anti-fragile strategy that I see 
implied by Luther’s understanding of the three orders as an indefinite de­
lay of the final apocalyptic occurrence. By its very nature, it is a reformist 
strategy—but not necessarily a revolutionary one. It is a strategy to live 
“between the times,” in the midst of a tension. Yet living between the
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times also means that the end of an historical cycle is eventually reached. 
Thus the challenge is how to be engaged as Christians in a reformist 
path even while “eagerly expecting” (apekdechomai, cf. Galatians 5 :5; 1 
Corinthians 1:7; Romans 8 :19)80 a revolutionary overhaul which, while 
not attempting to second-guess God’s own time, can nonetheless em­
brace a kairos that is inscribed in the very apocalyptic being of God and 
Christians. I would like to see this as a third, apocalyptic strategy where 
Christians, who by definition are a people marked by the praxis of the 
Holy Spirit, are ready to embrace an unforeseen event in history in part­
nership with their neighbors. Within this strategy—which condenses the 
other two—acts of engaging in socio-political reforms are carried out 
in preparation for and in anticipation of an event that can be neither 
foreseen nor predicted in all its details. The practices of equality, fair 
taxation, redistribution of income, freedom, sustainability, open access 
to the commons, etc. form the scaffolding on which, in the event of a 
radical break in history, a new “ordering” of global society can develop.81 
The centering of subjectivities in the apocalypse of God (Christ) propels 
a reformist tactic in the here and now while being open to—even eagerly 
expectant of—a revolutionary event in the near future.
Chaos theory may teach us here a very important “apocalyptic” les­
son: Like any living system, human societies are open systems at one 
point or another faced with a bifurcation. By all indications we are in 
fact approaching such a moment. The chronic crises that we are facing 
(debt, unemployment, health coverage, rising costs of education, etc.) 
suggest that the main structural problems cannot be resolved within the 
parameters offered by the system itself. It is only by going outside of and 
beyond the historical system that these crises can be (even temporarily) 
resolved. At the brink of bifurcation, it is chaos that dominates, meaning 
that “every small action during this period is likely to have significant 
consequences.”82 It is a time where little ripples can become unstoppa­
ble waves, where small gestures may have towering repercussions. Thus 
our engagement in “reformist” practices—just a collection of temporary 
measures—is not only important for creating breathing space for those 
who are suffocated by the market’s onslaught, but it is even more critical 
for providing a template and vectors for the future in a period when the 
system as such may be about to collapse. These practices are like writing 
a manual for how to create and live in a new society. Thus we may say we 
are reformists—not for the sake of keeping the system, but for the sake of
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new trajectories at the brink of an impending change still open regarding 
its outcomes. One thing must be clear: The capitalist world-system is 
reaching its nadir. What will come next is anybody’s guess, but we have 
a chance for engaging in action and thought that announce a coming 
system “where everybody has a place.”83
Finally, the church of Jesus Christ is the “laboratory” of the Spirit— 
which is to say, it is the location where new perspectival stances and new 
subjectivities are forged, ready to embrace new trajectories. And here, 
more than ever, the reversal initiated by Luther—namely, the replace­
ment of an economy of exchangeable signs by an economy of gift—is at 
the core of what the proclamation and embodiment of the Gospel does: 
the justification of the indebted by grace alone.84 Thus every assembly 
addressed by the Word, every Lord’s Prayer, every exorcism in baptism, 
and every sharing of the blessed sacrament is an anti-capitalist practice—  
despite the particular ideological makeup of those gathered, its leaders, 
or the denominational-institutional bylaws. To paraphrase the Augsburg 
Confession, section VII, the pure preaching of the Gospel and the cor­
rect administration of the sacraments acquire their proper outline against 
the background of a false gospel and a spurious administration of God’s 
gifts. This is the mind of Christ taking place in ours, establishing its own 
oeconornia through the conformation of a new body (cf. 1 Corinthians 
12). Indeed, the Word effects what it says.85
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